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Sanctuary Networks and Integrative
Enforcement
Ming Hsu Chen*
Abstract
My intended focus is on the widespread response—in cities,
churches, campuses, and corporations that together comprise
“sanctuary networks”1—to the Trump Administration’s Executive
Order 13768 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United
States2 as an instance of the changing relationship between federal,
local, and private organizations in the regulation of immigration.
After briefly covering the legal background of the Trump Interior
E.O., the focus of the Article shifts to the institutional dynamics
arising in communities. These institutional dynamics exemplify the
beginnings of a reimagined immigration enforcement policy with a
more integrative flavor.

* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law and Political Science
and Faculty-Director, Immigration Law and Policy Program. Special thanks to
David Baluarte and the W&L Editors, plus Symposium panelists Jason Cade,
Cesar Garcia Hernandez, and Stephen Lee. Huyen Pham, Shannon Gleeson, Rose
Villazor, Deep Gulasekaram, and U.C. Davis’ Advanced Immigration Seminar
provided valuable insights, and the U.C. Berkeley Center for the Study of Law
and Society provided a welcoming environment while I worked on this Article as
a visiting scholar. Further discussion of integrative enforcement can be found in
Constructing Citizenship for Noncitizens, Stanford University Press (forthcoming
2020).
1. This phrase comes from Rose C. Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Sanctuary Networks, 102 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 32),
https://www.immigrationresearch-info.org/system/files/SSRN-id3038943.pdf.
2. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter
Trump Interior E.O.] (defining “sanctuary jurisdictions” as those that “willfully
refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”). The term “sanctuary” or “sanctuary city”
is not defined by statute.
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I. Introduction
Despite the overwhelmingly exclusionary overtones in federal
immigration policy, integrative enforcement is emerging as a
response to President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (Trump Interior
E.O.).3 Taking seriously that laws operate in society and not
merely on-the-books, this Article enlarges the scope of
consideration to the interaction of the Interior E.O. with state,
local, and private resistance. It identifies an inclusionary
undercurrent in this web of resistance. This Article examines the

3.

Id.
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integrative nature of these networked policies and their
implications for national immigration policy.
Understanding the inclusionary thrust of emerging state,
local, and private policies towards immigrants requires
understanding the shifting terrain of immigration enforcement.
Immigration enforcement has been expanding and intensifying for
a while. The Trump Interior E.O. continues this trend by seeking
to further expand the targets of interior enforcement and to further
intensify punishment of sanctuary jurisdictions for noncooperation
with federal enforcement. As enforcement has expanded,
community resistance has also expanded to more sites and broader
purposes. Particularly prominent are courtroom challenges to the
Interior E.O. sanctuary provisions on the basis of immigration
federalism.4 States and localities have been winning these lawsuits
on the basis of constitutional issues such as the spending clause,
state sovereignty, and due process. These states and localities
claim to function as partners in immigration policymaking,
whether in a cooperative or uncooperative posture.5 Easier to miss
is the contestation over immigration policy occurring outside the
courts. Campuses, churches, and corporations are stepping into
the void, seeking to resist the federal government and to be
welcoming communities for immigrants rather than sites of
exclusion and intimidation. In a manner not compelled by law,
they voluntarily adopt value statements and spend (or raise)
money for optional resources to improve the lives of immigrants in
their communities.
After briefly tracing the historical and legal background of the
Interior E.O.’s expanded priorities and sanctuary provisions, this
Article examines the emergence of “sanctuary networks” as an

4. See generally PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN,
THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); see, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New
Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 704–22 (2013) (“‘[A]lienage laws,’
which are laws that determine the rights, privileges, and obligations of
noncitizens present in the United States, can . . . be enacted by either the federal
government or the states.”).
5. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1281–84 (2009) (discussing states’ role in enforcing federal
immigration law by stating that “some states have gone further than federal law
requires . . . while others have taken the opposite stance and passed
noncooperation laws that reject federal efforts”).

1364

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1361 (2018)

instance of what I will call “integrative enforcement” in
immigration policymaking.
II. Background on Interior E.O. and Sanctuary Networks
President Trump issued three immigration executive orders
within his first month in office that together reveal a federal policy
of vigorous enforcement against an expanding group of
immigrants. The Trump Interior E.O. and its accompanying
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations consist of a
package of policies concerning enforcement against immigrants
residing inside the borders, some of whom lack lawful immigration
status and some of whom have engaged in criminal activity.
Section 4 directs federal agencies to employ “all lawful means” to
execute U.S. immigration laws against “all removable aliens.” 6 As
part of this effort, Sections 8 and 9 seek to expand the local ability
to assist in enforcing immigration laws and to sanction “sanctuary
jurisdictions” that “prohibit or . . . restrict any government entity
or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”7
Though the moniker of sanctuary jurisdiction encompasses a range
of practices in a range of places, DHS-identified sanctuary
jurisdictions resist the enlarging enforcement-related goals of the
federal government. For example, sanctuaries resist the expansion
of priorities from “criminal aliens” to include undocumented
immigrants who possess little more than status violations and who
would have been considered low priorities for removal in the past.8
Sanctuary resistance might include: (1) barring investigation of
6. Trump Interior E.O., supra note 2, at 8799.
7. Id.; see City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2018 WL 2725503,
at *33 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2018) (“Because Section 1373 violates the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution, the City is entitled to a declaratory judgment on
Count VI of its Amended Complaint.”). The term “sanctuary” or “sanctuary city”
is not defined in the Executive Order.
8. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 1703, 1761 n.4 (2018). Advocates generally define sanctuary jurisdictions
more broadly than the Interior E.O., emphasizing the concept of providing safe
harbor to undocumented immigrants in the form of a protective shield or a
welcoming, inclusive environment.
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civil and criminal immigration violations by local law enforcement;
(2) limiting compliance with immigration detainers and
administrative immigration warrants; (3) refusing Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to local jails; (4) limiting
local law enforcement’s disclosure of sensitive information; and
(5) precluding local participation in joint operations with federal
immigration enforcement.9
Attorney General Jeff Sessions followed up on the Interior
E.O. with letters of warning to sanctuary jurisdictions10 and with
public speeches decrying the public safety risks introduced by
noncooperation.11 In direct response, cities and states began to
challenge the Department of Justice (DOJ) letters in court. These
lawsuits principally claim that the Interior E.O. and DOJ attempt
to withhold federal funding and condition federal grants on
compliance with Section 1373, breach constitutional limits on the
federal government’s powers under the Spending Clause and
anti-commandeering doctrine.12 A few cities and states have
9. As of April 1, 2018, there have been seventy sanctuary issuances since
Trump issued his Interior E.O. with the majority calling for stronger policies to
protect immigrants. Analysis based on id. at 1736–52; Understanding “Sanctuary
Cities”—Online
Appendix,
WESTMINSTER
L.
LIBR.,
http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342&p=5009807 (last updated June 6,
2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (compiling the sanctuary policies consulted in
writing Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
10. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Justice
Department Sends Letters to 29 Jurisdictions Regarding Their Compliance with
8 U.S.C. 1373 (Nov. 15, 2017) (noting the jurisdictions that “have primarily been
found to have laws, policies, or practices that may violate 8 U.S.C. 1373”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks About Carrying Out the
President’s Immigration Priorities (Oct. 20, 2017) (stating that sanctuary policies
“undermine the moral authority of law and undermine the safety of the
jurisdictions that adopt them”); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of
Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance
Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs
(Jul. 25, 2017) (“So called ‘sanctuary’ policies make all of us less safe because they
intentionally undermine our laws and protect illegal aliens who have committed
crimes.”); Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions
(Mar. 27, 2017) (describing sanctuary policies as “mak[ing] our nation less safe
by putting dangerous criminals back on our streets”).
12. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530–33 (N.D.
Cal. 2017) (addressing separation of powers and Spending Clause issues); City of
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 946–49 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (addressing
Spending Clause issues).
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introduced legislation challenging the Interior E.O. Most
prominently, the California Values Act13 declines to tell federal
immigration officials when incarcerated noncitizens will be
released from local jails (as required under the Secure
Communities program reinstated by the Interior E.O.); refuses to
detain immigrants for transfer to immigration enforcement;
establishes safe zones near courthouses, public schools, and health
facilities; and provides increased oversight and accountability of
cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE.14 Litigation
over these provisions is proceeding in court.15
Implementation of the broad directive to execute U.S.
immigration laws against “all removable aliens”16 has been more
diffuse. As ICE Director Thomas Homan said: “There’s no
population off the table . . . . If you’re in this country illegally, we’re
looking for you and we’re going to apprehend you.”17 In a
fulfillment of this promise, ICE conducted raids in neighborhoods
across the country, sweeping into its dragnet immigrants
conducting everyday affairs such as going to school and work and
those complying with routine check-ins for stays of removal. The
breadth of enforcement left noncitizens constantly worrying and
wondering if they could be next. Boasts from the government that
ICE is targeting noncooperating communities and immigrants’
rights activists intimidate and chill efforts to protect immigrants.
Wavering policies toward DREAMers18 incite fear that the
13. California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7284–7284.12. (West 2017)
(effective Jan. 1, 2018).
14. See id. § 7284.6 (refusing California law enforcement agency cooperation
with federal immigration enforcement on several matters).
15. See generally, e.g., United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077
(E.D. Ca. 2018) (evaluating the validity of three state laws meant to aid
undocumented immigrants).
16. Trump Interior E.O., supra note 2, at 8799.
17. Haley Sweetland Edwards, ‘No One is Safe.’ How Trump’s Immigration
Policy
is
Splitting
Families
Apart,
TIME
(Mar.
8,
2018),
http://time.com/longform/donald-trump-immigration-policy-splitting-families/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Joanna Walters, What Is DACA and Who Are the Dreamers?,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/sep/04/donald-trump-what-is-daca-dreamers (last visited Sept. 26,
2018) (explaining that DACA recipients are known as DREAMers because DACA
“was a compromise . . . after Congress failed to pass the so-called Development,
Relief and Education for Alien Minors (Dream) Act”) (on file with the Washington
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enforcement dragnet could sweep so broadly as to include those
who were until recently designated low priorities or nontargets for
enforcement. In short, the nonpriority enforcement agenda makes
everyone a potential priority for removal and the randomness of its
implementation amplifies its reach.
Colleges, churches, and corporations have resisted the
sanctuary provision by creating their own inclusive environments
to protect noncitizens in their communities. Campuses are creating
undocumented resource centers, issuing statements of solidarity
for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program
students and international students, and fundraising for DACA
renewal fees and legal counsel.19 Churches are offering food and
shelter to undocumented immigrants.20 Corporations are
protecting their employees from enforcement actions. These
protective actions seek to do more than resist federal ICE raids. As
with the sanctuary movements that preceded them, they appeal to
nonlegal sources of morality, such as human dignity, in their effort
to support noncitizens and seek to provide social support, economic
opportunities, and a political voice for noncitizens in the
community.
As immigration scholars Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Rose
Cuisson Villazor explain in their insightful article Sanctuary
Networks, these emerging sites of resistance can be understood to
operate as a “network” of challengers rather than isolated
instances of jurisdictional pushback.21 The networked institutions
resist several facets of federal enforcement, and their power
resides in their collective efforts to blunt federal enforcement and
welcome immigrants. As extralegal actors appealing to extralegal
norms, these sites are constrained in several respects. They rely on
and Lee Law Review).
19. See, e.g., Undocumented Student Program, U. CAL. BERKELEY,
https://undocu.berkeley.edu/home/our-history/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018)
(detailing the undocumented student program available at the University of
California at Berkeley) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal Sanctuary to
Undocumented
Immigrants?,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/17/us/
immigrants-sanctuary-churches-legality-trnd/index.html (last updated Feb. 27,
2017) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“[S]ince Trump was elected in November, the
number of churches in the United States expressing willingness to offer sanctuary
has doubled to 800.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 1, at 33.
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the soft power of media, purchasing power, and political influence
on legal decisionmakers to make their claims. These claims may
not be directed at the courtroom, nor will they necessarily prevail
in a legal challenge. Gulasekaram and Villazor say “each type of
sanctuary has an independent, normative value and legal
justification, but the ability of each to protect undocumented
immigrants is limited” when viewed in isolation.22 “Examined
together, however, these public and private groups are forming a
system that collaborates, formally in some contexts and informally
in others, to collectively challenge the federal government’s
claimed monopoly on setting immigration policy.”23 Social
scientists might refer to this type of exertion of influence through
a decentralized and decentered network as governance. Broadly
speaking, “[g]overnance may be defined as organized efforts to
manage the course of events in a social system.” 24 These organized
efforts may utilize the means of soft power in the form of
information, ideas, and financial and moral capital to influence
immigration policy.25 The specific ends of resistance may vary:
they may be disavowal of disagreeable immigration policy, support
for a vulnerable community, the pursuit of a particular decision
making process or policy, or the expression of an alternative vision
for immigration policy.26 I seek to define that alternative vision for
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review
of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) [hereinafter Changes in
Governance]; see also Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AUSTL. J. LEGAL
PHIL. 30, 30 (2005) [hereinafter Nodal Governance] (“Governance . . . is proving a
useful rubric for thinkers and researchers in a number of fields who are interested
in democracy, honest and efficient government, political stability and the rule of
law.”); R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Networks: A British Perspective, 2 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 293, 297 (1990) (describing “sub-government” as a policy-making process in
which the “distinction between government and non-government becomes
blurred”). For general history of governance, see generally Orly Lobel, New
Governance as Regulatory Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE
(David Levi-Four, ed. 2012).
25. See KURT A. STRASSER, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOOD WORKS, GOOD BUSINESS OR GREENWASH? 78 (2011)
(“‘Soft law’ methods depend upon the power of social and institutional norms,
information, and transparency to mobilize voluntary compliance.”).
26. See generally Nodal Governance, supra note 24. Of course, not all states
and localities share the purpose of resisting Trump policies, let alone shared
means. See MARGIE MCHUGH, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IN THE AGE OF TRUMP:
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national immigration policy—distinct from state or local
immigration policy—in the next section by elaborating on the
concept of “integrative enforcement.”
III. Integrative Enforcement
Building on the resistance function of sanctuary networks,
this section elaborates on the norm-creation function of sanctuary
networks by specifying their substantive content and end goal.
Integrative enforcement is premised on regulation of community
membership according to terms that extend beyond federal
immigration laws. Breaking outside of the terms of the federal
immigration statute and Interior E.O. leads to localized and
decentralized policymaking that emphasizes integrative goals and
recognizes the multiple facets of noncitizen belonging in a
community. These premises constitute what I call “integrative
enforcement.”
Integrative enforcement, expanded on in my in-progress book
Constructing Citizenship for Noncitizens, reflects an emerging
vision of integrative enforcement that presents an alternative to
the federal government’s focus on exclusion and enforcement on
the basis of one’s formal status as a noncitizen.27 Sanctuary
networks engaged in articulating the norm of integrative
enforcement seek to define who belongs in a community,28 and
what forms of relief should be available to those who do not
belong.29 On the question of who belongs, integrative enforcement
POPULIST BACKLASH AND PROGRESSIVE RESISTANCE CREATE DIVERGENT STATE
IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION CONTEXTS 2–9 (2018) (detailing the “numerous fronts” of
immigration policy being contested such as refugee resettlement, education, and
health and social services).
27. See generally MING H. CHEN, CONSTRUCTING CITIZENSHIP FOR
NONCITIZENS (forthcoming Stanford University Press 2020).
28. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 397–400 (2006) (discussing “membership
theory” as it relates to immigration law: “immigration law embod[ies] choices
about who should be members of society: individuals whose characteristics or
actions make them worthy of inclusion in the national community”).
29. See generally Jason Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era
of Mass Immigration Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053609; see Amanda Frost,
Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1, 29–38 (2017)
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in a sanctuary infuses the federal immigration enforcement
version of belonging with elements of broader membership
regulation, e.g. those who reside in a community possess social,
economic, and to some extent political ties to the U.S.30 As to the
question of claims to relief, noncitizens are entitled to institutional
protection and provision that goes beyond what is mandatory
under federal law.31 They are entitled to similar claims of
membership and as citizens residing in their communities.32
IV. Trump’s Interior E.O. and Sanctuary Jurisdictions
The primary example of sanctuary networks is the sanctuary
city movement. In the lawsuits brought by sanctuary jurisdictions,
the San Francisco City Attorney who filed the City and County of
San Francisco v. Trump33 lawsuit, Dennis Herrera, said in a press
release:
I’m grateful that we’ve been able to protect billions of dollars
that help some of the most vulnerable Americans. We’re talking
about low-income families, seniors, foster children and people
with disabilities. This is money that helps provide food, health
care and a roof over their heads . . . . Let me be clear. San
Francisco follows federal immigration law . . . . But our
teachers, doctors and police officers cannot be conscripted into
becoming immigration agents . . . .34

This quote reveals that San Francisco’s reason for noncooperation
is due to a distinctive notion of community membership and not
merely disagreement over the legality of the Interior E.O. As he
explained during a U.C. Berkeley Federalism Now panel:
(discussing different forms of relief such as “cancellation of removal” and “U
visas”).
30. See generally CHEN, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. See Frost, supra note 29, at 29–32 (describing options for cancellation of
removal).
33. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 530–33 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
34. Court Rules Trump’s Sanctuary Executive Order Is Unconstitutional,
CITY ATT’Y S.F. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/11/20/courtrules-trumps-sanctuary-executive-order-unconstitutional/ (last visited Sept. 26,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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It is not just about throwing down the gun of coercive federalism
in order to say, “hey, don’t make me disobey the Constitution.”
It’s about taking a stand and saying “this federal policy is
inconsistent with our local values.” It is about the California
versus Trump mindset on immigration.35

Similarly, Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel defends his city’s
challenge to the Interior E.O. and DOJ sanctions for
noncooperation with federal enforcement policy in broad terms:
We want you to come to Chicago if you believe in the American
dream . . . . By forcing us, or the police department, to choose
between the values of the city and the philosophy of the police
department, in community policing, I think it's a false choice
and it undermines our actual safety agenda.36

As previously described, the California Values Act steps up the
fight to protect immigrants with criminal histories who are subject
to enforcement actions by declining to notify federal immigration
officials when noncitizens will be released from local jails and
affirmatively providing safe zones.37 It seeks to advance improved
governance over immigration enforcement through increased
oversight and accountability of local-federal cooperation on
enforcement.38 Beyond legal argument, the justification for these
bold actions is that the California “[l]egislature finds and
declares . . . [that] [i]mmigrants are valuable and essential
members of the California community. Almost one in three
Californians is foreign born and one in two children in California
has at least one immigrant parent.”39
35. Dennis J. Herrera, S.F City Attorney, Speech at the U.C. Berkely
Conference: Federalism Now (Nov. 3, 2017).
36. Daniella Diaz & Laura Jarrett, Chicago Mayor Defends Lawsuit Against
DOJ Over Sanctuary City Status, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/07/politics/
rahm-emanuel-doj-sanctuary-city-cnntv/index.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2017)
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West 2018) (“California law enforcement
agencies shall not . . . for immigration enforcement purposes . . . [p]rovid[e]
information regarding a person’s release date . . . .”).
38. Id.
39. Id.; Tim Henderson, As Sanctuary State, California Takes Deportation
Fight to New Level, PEW TR.: STATELINE REP. (Oct 23, 2017),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/10/23/assanctuary-state-california-takes-deportation-fight-to-new-level (last visited Sept.
26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Some conservative
communities have opted out of the California Values Act. See Roxana Kopetman,
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A. Opposition to DACA Rescission and Enforcement on Campuses
Campuses seek to provide a safe place for a broad range of
noncitizens vulnerable to aggressive enforcement under the
Interior E.O.’s zero tolerance enforcement strategy.40 Campuses
providing a safe space for undocumented students are part of a
broader movement in universities to protect vulnerable students.41
This movement is broad and has a range of goals that include
noncooperation with law enforcement.42 However, they are not
Los Alamitos Votes to Opt Out of California Sanctuary Law, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/19/los-alamitos-immigration-debatesparks-singing-shouting/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018)
(discussing an example of one community rejecting the sanctuary law) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Geoffrey A. Hoffman, The Non-Priority Priorities, IMMIGR. PROF
BLOG, (Feb. 14, 2017), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2017/02/thenon-priorities-priorities-by-geoffrey-a-hoffman.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018)
(“[T]he [enforcement] ‘priorities’ do not protect most and perhaps not any
undocumented person, since asylum seekers, crime victims, children and others
with valid claims for relief are left wholly unprotected.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. The American Association of University Professors played a key role in
organizing and publicizing the movement, stating:
Of special importance is the status of those among our students who
are undocumented, many of whom have been in this country since early
childhood. Concern for the welfare of these students has already
prompted a rash of petitions calling on colleges and universities to
become “sanctuary campuses.” We support the movement for
sanctuary campuses.
The Atmosphere on Campus in the Wake of the Election, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS,
https://www.aaup.org/news/atmosphere-campus-wake-elections#.W4g6EtJKiUk
(last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review; see
also
Sanctuary
Campus
Movement,
AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS,
https://www.aaup.org/issues/sanctuary-campus-movement (last visited Sept. 26,
2018) (“The sanctuary campus movement calls on campuses to provide a safe
space for undocumented students.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). In comparison, other campuses have deflected the sanctuary label. For
example, Emory University said in a public statement, “Emory is not seeking to
establish itself as a sanctuary campus, for which there is no legal definition.” Julia
Preston, Campuses Wary of Offering ‘Sanctuary’ to Undocumented Students, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/education/edlife/
sanctuary-for-undocumented-students.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See Colleen Flaherty, Values for the Trump Era, INSIDE HIGHER ED,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/30/philosopher-proposes-code-con
duct-academics-mit-professors-affirm-commitment-shared
(last
updated
November 30, 2016) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (listing the 10-point
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limited to that goal. They also include generalized sensitivity
toward undocumented students and the generation of monetary,
academic, psychological, and potentially legal support for their
pursuit of education. The range and extent of the programs varies
on each campus, with public universities more constrained than
private universities in many cases—for example, Columbia and
Wesleyan have taken bolder stances and been more forceful in
refusing access to their campuses than public universities who are
state employees bound by 8 U.S.C. § 1373.43 Even though both
private and public campuses benefit from traditions of judicial
deference to educational institutions on First Amendment
grounds, federal statutes such as FERPA44 require campuses to
protect student privacy, and there is no federal obligation to collect
information about undocumented students.
Campus commitments to integrative enforcement are vivid on
campuses opposing the rescission of the DACA. Initiated in 2012
by President Obama, DACA was designed to ameliorate harshness
in the immigration enforcement regime and provide a measure of
protection and security to long-time permanent residents who
migrated without status as children.45 DACA improved the lives of
undocumented immigrants as much as it irked opponents.46 It
“Anti-Authoritarian Academic Code of Conduct” proposed by a University of Toronto
professor).
43. See Undocumented Students and DACA, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE
ADMISSIONS,
https://undergrad.admissions.columbia.edu/apply/first-year/un
documented-students (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (detailing how Columbia assists
undocumented individuals to apply and be eligible for financial aid) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Admission & Financial Aid Information
for Undocumented Students, WESLEYAN U., http://www.wesleyan.edu/admission/
apply/undocdaca.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (noting that students with or
without DACA can apply to Wesleyan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
44. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
45. See Jerry Markon & Sandhya Somashekhar, Obama’s 2012 DACA Move
Offers a Window into Pros and Cons of Executive Action, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-2012-daca-move-offersa-window-into-pros-and-cons-of-executive-action/2014/11/30/88be7a36-718811e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html?utm_term=.d98fd0ee9ef3 (last visited Sept.
26, 2018) (“The 2012 initiative has given temporary protection to slightly more
than 700,000 people brought to the United States illegally as children.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See id. (stating that many undocumented children praise DACA for
helping “them emerge from the shadows, making possible a work permit, a Social
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became a lightning rod for Obama’s immigration policies such that
conservative state governors and attorney generals challenged the
program’s close companion, Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability, in Texas v. United States47 in 2014 and threatened
to challenge DACA if President Trump did not withdraw it in Fall
2017.48 On September 5, 2017, President Trump withdrew the
program.49 Multiple lawsuits in California, New York,
Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia challenged the DACA
rescission on an expanded conception of the constitutional and
administrative due process owed to noncitizens.50 Simultaneously,
ongoing effort is being directed at lobbying Congress to pass
legislation that would provide a pathway to citizenship for
DREAMers.51 On the ground, immigration advocates are seeking
Security number and enhanced self-respect”).
47. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
48. See James Barragán, Paxton Threatens to Sue Over Immigration
Program if Trump Does Not Rescind It, DALL. NEWS, (June 29, 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2017/06/29/paxton-threatenssue- daca-trump-rescind-program (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Texas Attorney
General Ken Paxton and a 10-state coalition have threatened to sue the federal
government over an Obama-era program that protects unauthorized immigrants
if it is not rescinded by September.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
49. DHS Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279
F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401
(E.D.N.Y. 2018); Casa de Maryland v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d
758 (D. Md. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018);
Complaint, Trustees of Princeton v. United States, No. 1:17-CV-02325 (D.D.C.
2017); Complaint, Park v. Sessions, No. 1:17-CV-01332 (E.D. Va. 2017). On
January 9, 2018, the first federal court enjoined the DACA rescission. The Trump
Administration has appealed, and the litigation remains in progress. See Order
Denying FRCP 12(b)(1) Dismissal and Granting Provisional Relief, Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:17-CV-05211 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4345906/1-9-18-DACA-Opinion.
pdf.
51. Tal Kopan, DACA Alive, Barely, a Year After Trump Ended It, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/05/politics/daca-one-year-end-anniversary-future/
index.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Both the
House and Senate [have] tried and failed in the past year to pass legislation that
would have preserved DACA . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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to stabilize the legal status of DREAMers through a variety of
affirmative means: fundraising for legal assistance with DACA
renewals, pursuit of alternative relief, filing adjustment of status
petitions, rallies in solidarity with undocumented students, and
political pressure on Congress.52
From the start, immigration law has included equitable
exceptions for categories of immigrants such as DREAMers.53
DACA was an integrative program lodged within a federal
enforcement program. Its goals were to temper federal excess
around deportation and the erosion of equities. The campus and
community resistance to DACA’s rescission has focused on both
elements as well. Campuses and communities rally around
DREAMers who will be vulnerable to nonprioritized immigration
enforcement once their protection ends, and they fundraise for pro
bono legal assistance and pop-up clinics to renew DACA
applications or screen for alternative forms of relief.
Simultaneously, urgent and bipartisan appeals are being made for
Congress to redouble their efforts for a judicial and legislative
remedy for DREAMers.54 For example, Janet Napolitano, the
President of the University of California system and former DHS
Secretary issued this statement: “The University and the state of
California stand together in our belief that students should be
admitted to U.C. and other institutions of higher education based
on their records of achievement and without regard to their
52. See, e.g., Letter from Peter McPherson, President, Ass’n of Pub. &
Land-grant Univs., to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House of
Representatives Minority Leader, Charles Schumer, U.S. Senate Minority Leader
(Sept. 5 2018) (urging Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress to pass
DACA legislation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2087–89 (2008) (discussing prosecutorial discretion as a form of
“discretionary relief,” among other equitable measures, such as stay of removal).
54. See Brian Bennet & Lisa Mascaro, Bipartisan Senate Effort to Protect
Dreamers Collapses After Trump Threatens Veto, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-immigration-trump-20180215-story.html
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (noting that both parties have pushed for proDREAMer legislation, but they have been thwarted by Trump’s threats) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Congress has tried to pass a DREAM
Act for the last ten years. Several proposals were under consideration, but none
passed prior to the scheduled expiration of the DACA program on March 5, 2018,
or passage of the budget.
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immigration status.”55 After outlining several measures her
university will take to support undocumented students, including
in-state tuition, a DREAMer financial aid program, legal services,
campus-based student service centers, and directing campus police
not to contact, detain, question or arrest individuals based on
suspected undocumented status or enter agreements to undertake
joint efforts to make arrests for federal immigration law violations,
she explains that the U.C. system will explore additional options
in their “fight to keep the program alive.”56 This fight extended to
a lawsuit that temporarily enjoined the DACA rescission.57
Following the Northern District of California injunction,58 U.C.
President Napolitano said:
[E]ven with this decision, fear and uncertainty persist for DACA
recipients across California and the nation who want to
continue to live, work, learn and contribute to the country they
know as home. It does not negate, nor lessen, the urgent need
for permanent protection through a legislative solution. UC’s
DACA students represent the very best of our country and are
a key part of California and our nation's future. They are
studying to be doctors, teachers and engineers and working to
solve the greatest scientific and technological challenges of our
time.59

Federal courts in New York, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. have
since issued similar injunctions of the DACA rescission, while a

55. UC President Napolitano Denounces Decision to End DACA Program,
Calls on Congress to Make Protections Permanent, U. CAL. (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/press-room/uc-president-napolitanostatement-decision-end-daca-program (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. Id.
57. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C
17-05211 WHA, 2017 WL 4642324, at *55 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017) (order
granting motion to complete administrative record) (granting relief from DACA
rescission to allow the Department of Homeland Security to “complete the
administrative record” because it “excluded highly relevant materials”).

58. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp.
3d 1011, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining the defendant to maintain the DACA
program on a nationwide basis).
59. UC Statement on Federal Court’s DACA Ruling, U. CAL. DAVIS (Jan. 9,
2018), https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/uc-statement-federal-court%E2%80%99sdaca-ruling/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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federal court in Texas is seeking to reinstate it.60 Congressional
reform remains possible, but it is losing steam.61 The fate of the
DACA program and DREAMers will require resolution of these
split legal challenges in courts and Congress,62 and the broader
battle to reshape acceptance of the need to protect DACA recipients
will continue in the network of campuses and communities.
B. Opposition to Expanding Enforcement in Churches
For churches providing sanctuary to undocumented
immigrants, who are often members of mixed status families that
would be divided with deportation, protecting immigrants means
providing a literal safe haven from enforcement. While church
buildings are not exempt from immigration laws, they
traditionally have fallen into the category of sensitive areas and
avoided target enforcement.63 In Denver, five immigrants sought
60. See Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(calling defendant’s decision to rescind DACA an “arbitrary and capricious action”
because defendants “erroneously concluded that the program was
unconstitutional and unlawful”); Casa de Md. v. Trump, 284 F. Supp. 3d 758 (D.
Md. 2018); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018); cf. Texas v.
United States, No. 1:18-cv-00068, 2018 WL 4178970 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2018)
(evaluating state challenges to DACA reinstatement).
61. Hopes began to fade once Congress failed to pass legislation in time for
the March 5, 2018 deadline for DACA rescission. See Ali Rogan & Mariam Khan,
Dreamers Deferred as Congress Lets DACA Deadline Pass, ABCNEWS (Mar. 5,
2018, 5:48 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dreamers-deferred-congress-letsdaca-deadline-pass/story?id=53464924 (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell also made it clear after the failed Senate votes
that he would only be willing to bring to the floor DACA solutions that can pass
both the House and the Senate . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
62. The Supreme Court declined to review the cases ahead of Ninth Circuit
and Second Circuit appellate review. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the
Univ. of Ca., 138 S. Ct. 1182 (2018) (mem.) (denying certiorari); Order List: 583
U.S., SUP. CT. U.S., (Feb. 26, 2018) https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders
/022618zor_j426.pdf (denying certiorari and assuming “that the Court of Appeals will
proceed expeditiously to decide this case”).
63. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENF’T,
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AT OR FOCUSED ON SENSITIVE LOCATIONS 1 (2011) (“[The]
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policy regarding certain
enforcement actions by ICE officers and agents . . . is designed to ensure that
these enforcement actions do not occur at nor are focused on sensitive locations
such as schools and churches . . . .”).
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church-based sanctuary in the midst of intensifying enforcement
that threatened their protective shield.64 Unlike sanctuary
jurisdictions, campuses and churches are nongovernmental
institutions whose actions rely on soft power and creative
provisions to refashion federal immigration policy. They seek to
exert their influence subtly and indirectly. They claim that their
sought-after ends are normatively desirable, even if not legally
mandatory. They rely on societal norms and appeals to morality,
rather than legal argument and courthouses. A sanctuary coalition
of churches abides by a pledge that draws on both civic and moral
grounds for supporting immigrants and opposing immigration
policies.
As people of faith and people of conscience, we pledge to resist
the newly elected administration’s policy proposals to target
and deport millions of undocumented immigrants and
discriminate against marginalized communities. We will open
up our congregations and communities as sanctuary spaces for
those targeted by hate, and work alongside our friends, families,
and neighbors to ensure the dignity and human rights of all
people . . . . As people of faith and people of conscience, we will
take civil initiative out of our moral obligation to embody
principles of human rights and dignity and resist any harmful
and unjust policy proposals that further undermine due process
and lead to racial profiling and discrimination . . . we are ready
to open the doors of our sacred spaces and accompany those
facing deportation and discrimination . . . we support those
answering the call to provide sanctuary at schools, hospitals,
college campuses, and family homes.65

The high profile resistance of First Baptist Church in Denver,
the church providing sanctuary to Jeannette Vizguerra that led to
64. See Jenn Fields, Colorado Has More People Living in Church Sanctuary
than
Any
Other
State,
DENVER
POST
(Oct.
25,
2017),
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/10/25/colorado-undocumented-immigrants-inchurch-sanctuary/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“No other state has as many
people living in a church or temple to avoid deportation. One in every six people
in sanctuary in the United States is in Colorado.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The most famous is Jeanette Vizguerra, a mother of four
children who received a stay of deportation after eighty-six days residing in a
church.
65. We Pledge to Resist Deportation and Discrimination Through Sanctuary,
GROUNDSWELL,
https://action.groundswell-mvmt.org/petitions/we-pledge-toresist-deportation-and-discrimination-through-sanctuary (last visited Sept. 26,
2018) (emphasis added) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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her obtaining a two-year stay of removal, was marked by Vizguerra
and volunteers wearing t-shirts at her release saying “Keep
Families Together.”66 Her church shares with other churches in
pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant jurisdictions the common
purpose of acting on a moral calling to engage in civic action that
imagines a more humane, integrative immigration enforcement
policy. Hers is potentially more willing to adopt a civic stance that
directly confronts the government given that Denver is
pro-immigrant and has adopted sanctuary city policies.
Nationwide, the bolder churches publicly declare their sanctuary
stance in defiance of anti-harboring provisions in the INA, on the
theory that the publicity creates a shield against liability since
they are not acting in secret, or avail themselves of religious
freedom guarantees such as Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and the First Amendment.67 In jurisdictions that are less
sympathetic to immigrants, churches buffer their moral impetus
with less direct civic engagement—for example, by insisting on
search warrants before letting ICE enter their sanctuaries or
keeping quiet their offers of sanctuary to immigrants fearing
deportation—to reduce friction in their communities.68 So far

66. See Noelle Phillips, Jeanette Vizguerra Leaves Sanctuary After 86 Days
Avoiding Immigration Authorities, DENVER POST (May 12, 2017), https://www
.denverpost.com/2017/05/12/jeanette-vizguerra-arturo-hernandez-garcia-staydeportation/ (last updated May 12, 2017) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Vizguerra
left First Baptist Church in Denver Friday morning with about two dozen
supporters singing a song in Spanish . . . . Vizguerra’s story has generated
international headlines and prompted TIME magazine last month to name her
one of the magazine’s 100 most influential people in the world.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion] . . . .”); Jason Hanna, Can Churches Provide Legal
Sanctuary to Undocumented Immigrants?, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
2017/02/17/us/immigrants-sanctuary-churches-legality-trnd/index.html
(last
updated Feb. 17, 2017) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing “the Immigration
and Nationality Act prohibit[ing] anyone from knowingly harboring an
undocumented immigrant” but finding that “[i]n general, prosecutors probably
won’t go after a pastor” for fear of bad publicity) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
68. See Hanna, supra note 67 (“Offering sanctuary at a church can involve
providing food and shelter for an immigrant, as well as staffing volunteers to stay
with that person around the clock.”).
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under the Trump Administration, no sanctuary churches have
confronted a legal challenge.69
C. Corporations Resisting Worksite Enforcement, DACA, and
Travel Ban
Just as powerful, if less visible, was the outcry from Google,
Apple, Facebook, Uber, Lyft, and other technology companies
against restrictive immigration policies.70 These technology
companies opposed the first travel ban almost immediately and
were joined by more than 150 companies who issued public
statements, social media pressure, and eventually an amicus brief
in the lawsuit proceeding against the travel bans.71 Facebook
C.E.O. Mark Zuckerberg posted at the time, “[m]y great
grandparents came from Germany, Austria and Poland. [My wife]
Priscilla's parents were refugees from China and Vietnam. The
United States is a nation of immigrants, and we should be proud
of that.”72 Apple reminded consumers that founder Steve Jobs’

69. Nonenforcement in churches is in keeping with ICE’s policy to treat
churches as sensitive locations, though the policy is nonbinding on ICE. See FAQ
on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc (last updated
Jan. 31, 2018) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing ICE policy related to
immigration enforcement in “sensitive locations” such as schools and churches)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, ICE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM ON ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AT OR FOCUSED ON
SENSITIVE LOCATIONS (2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2policy.pdf (same).
70. See Don Reisinger, Major Tech Companies Line Up Against Travel Ban,
FORTUNE MAG. (April 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/20/tech-companytravel-ban/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (discussing technology companies’ brief
opposing “Trump’s latest travel ban”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). More travel ban responses: Uber boycott/CEO resignation, Lyft $1
million to ACLU, Starbucks hiring 10,000 refugees.
71. See Brief of Technology Companies as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017)
(No. 17-1351) (arguing that Trump’s Executive Order is unlawful and noting that
“[i]mmigrants or their children founded more than 200 of the companies on the
Fortune 500 list, including Apple”).
72. Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.facebook.
com/zuck/posts/10103460278231481?pnref=story (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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father immigrated from Syria.73 The same companies have adopted
in-house policies for hiring DACA recipients with work permits
and have made public statements opposing the DACA rescission.74
Technology companies have long been protective of foreign workers
who are vital to their businesses. Thus, it is no surprise they have
supported H1-B visas and resisted restrictive employment laws
that dampen foreign competition such as the Hire America, Buy
America Executive Order.75 Start-up executive (Y Combinator)
said:
Silicon Valley is stepping up. The companies are working on
three fronts: They are vociferously objecting to the Trump
policies they think are bad, they are trying to engage with him
to influence his behavior, and they are developing new
technology to work against policies and political discourse they
don’t support.76

Less formally, tech companies facilitate the use of texting and
social media to warn immigrants of imminent raids and software
73. See Simon Jary, Who Is Steve Jobs’ Syrian Immigrant Father,
MACWORLD (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/apple/who-issteve-jobs-syrian-immigrant-father-abdul-fattah-jandali-3624958/ (last visited
Sept. 26, 2018) (“While some people are horrified at the numbers fleeing
Syria, . . . many have pointed out that previous Syrian migrants have boosted the
West’s culture, business and technology—most notably the biological father of
Steve Jobs—Abdul Fattah Jandali . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
74. See Microsoft President to Trump: To Deport a DREAMer, You’ll Have to
Go Through Us, NPR (Sept. 5, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/09/05/548686695/250-apple-employees-among-thousands-at-risk-fromdaca-cancellation (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“Dozens of CEOs including Jeff
Bezos of Amazon, Reed Hastings from Netflix, Randall Stephenson from AT&T
and Tim Sloan of Wells Fargo wrote a letter addressed to the president asking
him to preserve [DACA]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. See An Open Letter From Technology Sector Leaders on Donald Trump’s
Candidacy for Presidency, NEWCO SHIFT (July 14, 2016),
https://shift.newco.co/an-open-letter-from-technology-sector-leaders-on-donaldtrumps-candidacy-for-president-5bf734c159e4 (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“We
are inventors, entrepreneurs, engineers, investors, researchers, and business
leaders working in the technology sector . . . . We believe in an inclusive country
that fosters opportunity, creativity and a level playing field. Donald Trump does
not.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. David Streitfeld, Tech Opposition to Trump Propelled by Employees, Not
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/
business/trump-travel-ban-apple-google-face book.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept.
26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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apps to circumvent cell phone surveillance at borders.77 The
Chamber of Commerce has set forward the Visit the U.S. Coalition
to encourage international travelers to visit the U.S. and counter
a Trump slump in tourism.78
Corporate resistance extends beyond technology firms that
rely on foreign workers for comparative advantage. Larger
corporations, which tend to be more politically conservative, have
expressed support for employees with DACA as part of their
support for diversity in their corporate missions.79 Chobani and a
cadre of independent coffee shops utilize targeted hiring and job
training for refugees.80 Small companies and restaurants with
immigrant workers are preparing to balance their obligations to
comply with worksite laws and protecting workers who may
become the target of worksite raids, e.g., union organizing and
7-Eleven raids,81 through indirect opposition that enables workers
77. See Issie Lapowsky, A Portable Panic Button for Immigrants Swept Up
in Raids, WIRED (March 10, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/portablepanic-button-immigrants-swept-raids/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (noting that an
app has been created to “select contacts they would want to notify in case of
emergency and pre-load personalized messages to each recipient”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. See Who We Are, VISIT U.S. COALITION, https://www.visituscoalition.com/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (explaining the Visit U.S. Coalition’s goals and
policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. Goldman Sachs, Nike, Coca Cola, and Ford Motor Company adopted
diversity statements. For example, Ford’s Executive Chairman Bill Ford said:
“Respect for all people is a core value of Ford Motor Company, and we are proud
of the rich diversity of our company here at home and around the world. That is
why we do not support this policy or any other that goes against our values as a
company.” See Diversity and Inclusion, FORD, https://corporate.ford.com/company
/diversity.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (stating that diversity has always been
a key to Ford’s success) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. See Chobani Founder Stands By Hiring Refugees, 60 MINUTES (Apr. 6,
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chobani-founder-stands-by-hiring-refugees/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (providing jobs, transportation, and translators at
Chobani plants for refugees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. See Former Head of ICE Discusses Raids on 7-Eleven Stores, NPR (Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/11/577453468/former-head-of-icediscusses-raids-on-7-eleven-stores (discussing ICE raids at 7-Eleven stores
resulting in twenty-one arrests of illegal immigrants) (last visited Sept. 26, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). California Legislation AB 450
and community organizations outline some employer resistance strategies that
stay within the bounds of federal enforcement and protect immigrants, for
example, by insisting on search warrants in private workspaces and providing
legal assistance to workers.
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to continue working as independent contractors or relying on
franchise and other flexible corporate forms, hiring legal counsel
and providing know your rights workshops in anticipation of
worksite raids, invoking their private property rights to bar or
monitor ICE access. Some of these protective measures are
captured in California’s AB 450, which limits employer cooperation
with ICE worksite enforcement, while most are adopted without
mandatory state requirements.82
V. Constructing Citizenship Through Integrative Enforcement
To recap my argument, sanctuary networks exemplify the
integrative enforcement ideal of shared governance over
immigration policy. Sanctuary jurisdictions signify the value of
immigrants as members of the community by recognizing the full
range of contributions of immigrants. They do this instead of
fixating on immigration status. More ambitiously, they express
their recognition of their societal obligation to integrate citizens
rather than viewing integration as a one-way process with the
onus on immigrant individuals to conform to societal norms. They
expect themselves to enact policies and practices consistent with
these obligations, and they make demands on the federal
government to participate in a shared project of integrative
enforcement.
For many, the norms and principles they seek to advance go
beyond policy reforms and enforceable legal mandates: they state
that noncitizens deserve protections of dignity and due process
such as access to hospital emergency care, protection of courts,
protection from splitting mixed-status families, the ability to
82. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7285–7285.3 (West 2017) (“[T]he bill would
prohibit an employer . . . from providing voluntary consent to an immigration
enforcement agent to enter nonpublic areas of a place of labor . . . .”). Some
businesses oppose Section 7285 of the California Government Code. For example,
Motel 6 is accused of voluntarily providing guests’ personal information to ICE in
six hotel locations. See Richard Gonzalez, Motel 6 Sued, Again, for Identifying
Latino Guests to ICE, NPR (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/01/23/580149434/motel-6-sued-for-identifying-latino-guests-for-immigrationagents (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (alleging that providing ICE with personal
information violated “federal and state laws barring discrimination based on
national origin, and protecting against unreasonable searches”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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express opinions and petition the government through protest,
media, and appeals to elected officials. Noncitizens with criminal
histories deserve to be considered part of the public safety equation
who are seen as community members who might be victimized by
crime and empowered to report it, rather than the source of public
safety risks. Noncitizen students deserve educational access
unencumbered by immigration enforcement in sensitive locations
such as schools. Noncitizen workers deserve opportunities to work,
workplace safety, and protections from discrimination,
harassment, and unlawful raids. In other words, noncitizens
deserve to be considered American socially and culturally, even if
they lack formal legal status. Consistent with the slogan for Define
America, a nonprofit dedicated to DREAMers, “We are Americans.
Just not legally.”83
Importantly, sanctuary networks go beyond articulating
norms and policies of inclusion for themselves. They seek to shape
the national conversation on immigration. This effort includes
policy, but it is not limited to it; norm-setting extends through
broad tactics and is directed at an array of normative ends. This is
collectively how sanctuary networks advance an alternate vision
for immigration that includes integration for the broader category
of noncitizen workers, churchgoers, and community members
rendered vulnerable under aggressive enforcement.
Practically speaking, how do these principles translate into a
national immigration policy of integrative enforcement? This Part
distills the underlying principles that lie beneath the governance
strategies and policies sought in sanctuary networks.
A. Rebalancing the Federal Enforcement-Only Immigration
Agenda to Include Integration
Sanctuary networks are rethinking the federal government’s
regulation of membership for noncitizens. The emphasis in federal
immigration law for the last decade has been on enforcement of
formal immigration status: preventing unlawful entry, barring
access to work and public services, detaining those suspected of
83. We Are Americans, Just Not Legally, TIME (June 25, 2017),
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120625,00.html (last visited Sept.
26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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lacking documentation, and deporting immigrants with minor
crime and status violations. Immigration law gives little thought
to immigrant integration in the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) monitored pathway to citizenship.
It gives even less thought to integration in the strenuous push for
deportation that has eliminated many of the remedies for unlawful
status that previously permitted adjustment of status and
adjudicative discretion that permitted consideration of
proportionality in individualized cases.84
Challenges to this asymmetric approach to immigration policy
would require building a stronger infrastructure for integration.
While such efforts are not confined to the federal level, they must
include it because the federal government has distinctive
capabilities as a gatekeeper to formal citizenship. Preserving
integration at the federal level means encouraging the federal
government’s few integrative spaces to remain committed to
integration and discouraging the conflation of enforcement
missions into those functions. Within the DHS, for example, the
USCIS needs safeguarding of its statutory mission to grant visas,
work permits, and other immigration benefits and strengthening
of its community outreach functions to affirmatively assist with
adjustments to status for newcomers, permanent residents, and
U.S. citizens.85 USCIS should offer education for the next step to
citizenship at each phase of naturalization (i.e. LPR applications
at entry, naturalization applications at permanent residence). ICE
and CBP need to recognize the potential for abuse if they encroach
too heavily on USCIS’s functions, for example, the institution of
84. See Frost, supra note 29, at 29–36 (listing as examples cancellation of
removal, U-visas, Special Immigration Juvenile Status Visas, and waivers and
exceptions for unlawful presence); Cade, supra note 29, at 8 (discussing the ways
in which sanctuary networks erect front-line equitable screens, promote
procedural fairness, and act as last-resort circuit breakers in the administration
of federal deportation law).
85. In contrast to the suggested approach, the USCIS in March 2018
changed its mission statement to emphasize the efficient administration of
immigration law and protection of Americans rather than service to noncitizens:
“U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation’s lawful
immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and
fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans,
securing the homeland, and honoring our values.” About Us, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last updated Mar. 6, 2018) (last
visited Sept. 26, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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extreme vetting or taking people off the pathway to citizenship for
technical problems with their green card or decades-old minor
offenses.86 Outside DHS, civil rights agencies, workplace agencies,
and law enforcement agencies can be held to account for adherence
to statutory mandates to provide educational opportunity, fair
workplaces, and community safety in a manner not conditioned on
immigration status. Interagency task forces on language and
national origin enable cooperation and sharing of best practices
across those agencies and memoranda of agreements guard
against harmful complicity such as FEMA denying emergency care
to immigrants or the Department of Labor using information about
worker immigration status to tip off ICE. A federal immigration
office (outside of DHS and DOJ) can connect these efforts to the
President’s policy priorities.
Challenging the status quo would require networked sites to
push for a re-examination of the federal government’s expanded
notions of criminality, security, and immigration enforcement.
Congress needs to alter the priorities for immigration enforcement
and forge pathways to citizenship through legislative reform.
Executive agencies need to widen opportunities for enforcement
discretion and enable adjustment of status for those newly eligible
to do so. Courts need to mitigate overly harsh administration of
federal immigration laws by safeguarding due process for
immigrants facing removal. The overarching idea is to rebalance
enforcement-only status quo and to build national norms and
policies of integration.87
B. Connect Sanctuary Networks with National
Immigration Policy
State, local, and nonprofit organizations have led the way on
immigrant integration with civics education workshops, cultural
86. Many policy changes show this encroachment, for example, see
Memorandum from Rex Tillerson, Sec’y of State, Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t
Homeland Sec., Daniel Coats, Dir., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to
Donald Trump, President of the United States (Oct. 23, 2017) (applying extreme
vetting to refugee and military veteran applications for legal permanent
residence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See id. (providing an example of “enforcement-only” policy lacking
integration efforts).
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exchange, and language support that facilitate social integration
and cultivate the development of skills and attitudes that facilitate
economic integration.88 Private entities and individuals such as
churches, corporations, and campuses are joining them. A goal of
this Article has been to show how these decentralized efforts
collectively temper federal enforcement excess and advance a
vision for national immigration policy premised on shared
responsibility for integration as a societal obligation rather than
an optional exercise. This two-part function is the essence of
sanctuary networks and integrative enforcement: speaking out for
themselves and confronting the federal government.
As the sanctuary network examples demonstrate, integration
can proceed in an independent or in an intertwined fashion with
federal immigration enforcement. These networks can focus on
short-term policy change or articulate norms for long-term vision.
While isolated efforts to integrate immigrants within
communities, churches, and corporations are valuable for their
own sake—often achieving what would be unachievable in another
setting—I suggest that there is benefit to a more cohesive linking
up of the national conversation on immigration. Community
organizations that offer assistance with English language and
civics tests and naturalization applications could frequent USCIS
naturalization ceremonies and interviews that lead to permanent
residence. Civics education and community protest or mobilizing
opportunities could be paired with voter registration drives. Legal
clinics providing free or low-fee legal assistance for immigrants
seeking income security, lawful means for remaining within the
country, or other forms of protection from deportation could be
broadened to support those making the transition to citizenship,
especially given that the pathway is increasingly riddled with
tripwires for enforcement. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
88. For examples of scholarship on immigrant integration in the local
context, see ELS DE GRAAUW, MAKING IMMIGRANT RIGHTS REAL: NONPROFITS AND
THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATION IN SAN FRANCISCO (2016) (detailing how non-profits
started to aid undocumented immigrants can achieve their goals in the face of
inherent limitations); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 743 (2013) (“[S]tate and local immigrant-inclusionary
rulemaking has begun to outstrip immigrant-exclusionary regulations.”);
Cristina Rodriguez, Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 581–609 (2008) (providing several examples of states and
localities providing services for immigration integration).
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is one of a few models for linking federal and local integration
efforts in a manner that goes beyond funding. The federal
government handles refugee determinations and local
organizations and nonprofits assist with resettlement, often with
federal funding.89 AmeriCorps has a pilot program that places
native-born U.S. volunteers in immigrant communities.90 A
counterpart, RefugeeCorps, has been proposed to permit skill
development and societal contribution that offsets cost, builds good
will, and builds bridges to mainstream communities (similar to the
military).91 Beyond specific policy prescriptions, sanctuary
networks can advance a long-term vision for shared governance of
immigration that includes multiple actors and not merely a contest
of state versus local laws.
C. Rethink Connection Between Enforcement and Citizenship as
Membership in Society
Taken together, the sanctuary networks highlighted in this
Article reveal a culture of valuing immigrants as members of
society and not merely bearers of status. This vision extends
beyond short-term policy fixes. The overarching vision being set
through their norm-setting recognizes the substantive experiences
of immigrants—social, economic, cultural, and political—rather
than fixating on their legal status in a way that is circumscribed
by their lack of formal citizenship. U.S. immigration policy needs
89. See Memorandum from Rex Tillerson, supra note 86 (reviewing the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program and advising how to heighten vetting process).
90. USCRI Announces New Refugee AmeriCorps Program, USCRI (July
2016), http://refugees.org/news/uscri-announces-new-refugee-americorps-program/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (“[AmeriCorps] volunteers are crucial to providing
refugee clients with English instruction, cultural orientation, mentoring,
assistance with housing, employment, health care, and education, financial
literacy, and many other services.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
91. See generally STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES BY WELCOMING ALL
RESIDENTS: A FEDERAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
INTEGRATION, WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON NEW AMERICANS (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/final_tf_newameric
ans_report_4-14-15_clean.pdf (discussing contributions of immigrants and
presenting the president with a plan to “integrat[e] newcomers into the social,
cultural, and economic fabric of our country”).
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this type of reorientation to better balance integration and
enforcement. While the federal government maintains sovereignty
over the regulation of its borders and the composition of its
membership, immigrants are part of the national community once
they reside in the United States. Seeing immigrants as community
members requires that society and government institutions share
in the task of integration, particularly during the time when
immigrants lack access to the full range of political and legal rights
presumed to be preconditions for full belonging for other
marginalized groups.92 For those undocumented immigrants who
lack a pathway to legal status, the federal government’s assistance
is needed to facilitate their transition to full belonging—legal
reform to create a pathway, administrative support to access that
pathway, and practical assistance to realize the benefits of
pursuing it.
Viewing immigrants as threats to extinguish, rather than
community members to embrace, prevents the immigrants who are
already living in the United States. from properly innovating and
adapting to a diverse, global society. Integrative enforcement rests
on a premise of linked fate among citizens and noncitizens. The
U.S. military’s ability to cultivate a strong sense of substantive
belonging for noncitizens who become eligible to naturalize
through their national service models the cultivation of
membership across legal status. The refugee program linking the
federal government with churches and voluntary initiatives of
private corporations to help refugees find jobs exemplify a
multifaceted network of federal and local, public and private actors
working toward economic integration. While these programs do not
currently extend to all types of noncitizens, they build the societal
conditions to make possible a political commitment to bettering the
economic, political, social, and legal integration of noncitizens.
Enforcement policies that limit migration, block integration,
and permanently exclude noncitizens from joining society fuel
societal division and ultimately prove self-defeating. Hostility
toward immigrants breaks down the social fabric. The lost sense of
92. See CHEN, supra note 27 (describing government interventions to assist
the naturalization process). See generally IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN:
INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
(2006) (providing an interesting perspective on how the United States and
Canada encourage foreigners to achieve citizenship).
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fairness for those excluded from basic protections alienates
individuals and corrodes government legitimacy. The resulting
weakening of citizenship as an institution breeds threats to public
safety and national security.93 Revitalizing the sense that
citizenship is a shared exercise and a goal that is worth
encouraging—rather than a birthright that is passively granted,
denied, or removed at the hands of the federal
government—reinvigorates
the
nation.
Integration
and
enforcement are both needed, and they are not necessarily at odds.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has argued that integration is missing from the
national conversation about immigration. Social networks of
public and private institutions need to work together to construct
new norms for the immigration agenda. The federal government,
in particular, has a special responsibility to promote integration
alongside the state, local, and non-governmental community
groups that have traditionally served as the engines of integration.
This is because the federal government is the gatekeeper to
citizenship and formal citizenship is the coin of the realm in a
political climate fixated on enforcement.
Undoubtedly, the federal government’s dual responsibility for
immigration enforcement and immigrant integration is vexing.
However, the federal government’s nearly exclusive focus on status
enforcement and courts’ and Congress’s unwillingness to challenge
this expansive enforcement agenda over the past decade is a
mistake. Immigration lawyers, scholars, and policymakers concede
too much when they give up on the notion of integrative
enforcement as an alternative normative foundation for policy.
That enforcement remains the preoccupation of federal
immigration policy is unlikely to change given the continuing
inability of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform
and the lack of political will to overcome President Trump’s
immigration policies. Our immigration laws need to recognize
93. The essays comparing U.S. and European approaches toward managing
security note that the United States focuses on the “enemy abroad” while Europe
focuses on the “enemy within.” SIMON REICH, IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND
SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (2008).
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immigrants consist of more than their status and that there are
different kinds of enforcement goals for differently-situated
immigrants. DACA recipients are not social or cultural threats,
high tech and guest workers are not stealing jobs, and refugees are
not always trying to drain the welfare state. Unlawful presence or
lapses in immigration status do not by themselves make one unfit
for citizenship. Immigrants from countries in disfavor are not all
criminals and national security threats. Enforcement-first policy
goals do not have to mean enforcement-only policies. Other norms
and values—arising from social norms, local practices, and
international law—can and do apply in ways that blunt
enforcement excess and extend the capacity for integration.
Disengagement of those who disagree with the federal
immigration policy does not help. The Article highlights examples
of cities, states, corporations, churches, and campuses infusing
enforcement with a more integrative flavor, which models a way to
advance a conversation based on a different conceptual foundation
for citizenship. In this way, they can fill critical gaps. They can also
transform the national conversation. In the long run their efforts
to affix the regulation of citizenship status to membership, rather
than formal status, clarifies the purpose of regulating membership
in a nation-state. The clarified vision develops new policy tools and
charts new policy pathways that go beyond the current
institutional design that disfavors noncitizens.
In closing, enforcement measures can exist alongside
integrative goals in immigration. While this Article adopts the
belief that incorporating immigrants serves the nation, it is not a
plea for undermining the federal government’s ability to protect its
borders, allocate its resources, or define its membership. The fate
of integration and enforcement are bound up in one another. They
are intertwined in networks of shared governance, as opposed to
distinct functions that can be rigidly divided among different
institutional sectors or levels of government.

